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NOTES
CORPORATIONS: THE PROMOTER'S DILEMMA
ROBERT L. HENRY

III*

The scope of this note will be limited to the question of the
liability of the corporation for the pre-incorporation services
and expenses of the bona fide promoter and will not consider the
question of subsequent adoption of the promoter's contracts or
the subject of "secret profits." An attempt also will be made to
show that the courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in
the pre-incorporation period and that, in attempting to avoid
them, they have perhaps unwittingly discriminated against the
promoter in favor of others. Finally, a solution will be
suggested as a cure for a situation which at present and for a
long time past has existed as an unfair condition without an
adequate remedy.
For the benefit of those who may have the fiction and screen
conception of the promoter as one who serves no real economic
purpose, but is instead a "slicker" trying to sell a "gold brick"
or worthless stock and therefore not entitled to any compensation or consideration, it is felt necessary to define "promoter"
and to quote from one of the classic cases on the subject, Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Copper Co:
"The term 'promoter' is a term not of law but of business. A promoter is one who seeks opportunities for making advantageous purchases and profitable investments in industrial or other enterprises,
who interests men of means in such a project, when found organizes
them in a corporation for the purpose of taking over the project, and
attends upon the newly formed company until it is fully launched in
business. He may be a stockholder, director, officer or none of these.
His services begin before the company is formed and ordinarily are
not concluded until sometime after its formation.""

Such a definition is, however, incomplete in that it fails to
indicate that "the promoter is the creative force of the corporate
enterprise, for corporations do not spring into being spontane* The writer of this note, a member of the Law Journal staff,
is the son of the contributor of the leading article to be found on page
369.
, Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 74
N. J. Eq. 457, 71 Atl. 153, 171 (1908).
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ously."2 It must also be remembered in looking at successful
organizations that often "behind the veil of outward effort and
apparent achievement stand the initiative, resourcefulness, and
driving force of a single man",3 the promoter.

There are many degrees of service which a promoter may
perform for the benefit of the future corporation for which he
should be compensated. Thhse vary from the mere conception of
the enterprise to pushing the project through to success as a
going business. The promoter may go to some very real
expense hiring engineers, accountants and lawyers and spending many months investigating the project himself. He may go
to considerable labor and expense in acquiring property for the
use of the future corporation and in supervising improvements
on the property. In most cases, however, the promoter makes
it clear to everyone with whom he deals that they must look to
the future corporation and not to him for reimbursement and
that any contracts the promoter makes for services or property
are in the name of the future corporation. Ordinarily after the
concern is fully organized and incorporated the promoter is
voted a handsome reward for his services in the form of stock
in the corporation, the customary amount being 10% of the
total stock issue where his services were merely creative,
although he might take as much as 51% where he combined the
services of promoter, investor and banker. 4 It is, however, with
the cases where the corporation refuses to compensate the
promoter or to adopt specifically his pre-incorporation contracts
that the body of this paper deals.
The general weight of authority in the United States stands
clearly for the proposition that a corporation is not liable for the
pre-incorporation services and expenses of the promoter unless it
expressly agrees to make such payment or unless the court can
infer from the facts a new contract to reimburse him. 5 This is
'Erich, M. W. & Bunzl, L. C., Promoters' Contracts, (1929) 38 Yale
L. J. 1011.
' Dewing, A. S., The Financial Policy of Corporations (3rd. rev.
ed. 1934) 248.
'Id. at 264.
' Gardiner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 273 F. 441, 445 (1921);
United German Silver Co. v. Bronson, 92 Conn. 266, 102 Atl. 647
(1917); New Illinois Athletic Club of Chicago v. Genslinger, 211 11l.
App. 220 (1918); Western Screw Mg. Co. v. Cousley, 72 Ill. 531
(1874); Rockford R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328, 16 Am. Rep.
587 (1872); Hatcher-Powers Shoe Co. v. Kirk, 233 Ky. 19, 24 S. W.
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also the English rule, but the law in England goes a step further
and provides emphatically that not only is the corporation not
liable to the promoter, but that neither is it liable to strangers
with whom a promoter may have contracted in the name of the
corporation. 6 The American courts, as will be shown, are considerably less emphatic in regard to this latter position, and the
text writers, although they agree in principle with the majority
view, often sympathize with the minority view without attempting to justify it. 7 The main hurdle over which the majority of
the courts refuse to jump in holding as they do, is comprised of
three elements, two being of the law of contracts. The first is,
that prior to the act of incorporation no such thing as the
corporate entity existed and therefore at the time the services
were performed or the contracts made, there was no principal
and consequently no privity between the parties. Secondly, that
in order to have a valid contract there must be an acceptance.
Before its existence the corporation cannot accept and afterwards it cannot object to the rendition of services or avoid
benefits which have already been performed without uncreating
itself. The third element is perhaps fundamental, in that the
courts feared that the interests of future stockholders would be
prejudiced if the promoter were allowed to indebt the corporation before it came into existence.8 As to the first two elements
there is no satisfactory answer. They are good law; although
the result of the hurdle which they support may create an
injustice. But as to the third element neither the corporation
nor the stockholders would be substantially harmed or affected
(2d) 903 (1930); Marchand v. Loan & Pledge Assn., 26 La. Avv.
No. 389, p. 269 (1874); Tuttle v. Geo. H. Tuttle Co., 101 Me. 287, 64
Atl. 496 (1906); Tift v. Quaker City Natl. Bk., 141 Pa. 550, 21 Atl.
660 (1891); Weatherford, etc., Ky. Co. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 357, 24
S. W. 795 (1894); Hall v. Vt., etc., R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 401, 406 (1886).
"In re English & Colonial Produce Co., Ltd., 2 Ch. 435, 4 B. R. C.
748 (1906). 5 Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd. ed. 1934) sec. 204,
114.
,Alger, Promoters & Promotion of Corporations, 210 and 224,
cited in Maryland Apartment Hse. Co. v. Glenn, see note 17; Machen,
Modern Law of Corporations (1908) secs. 323 and 338; Morawitz,
Private Corporations (2nd. ed. 1886) sec. 547; Thompson, Corporations (3d. ed. 1927) sec. 103, p. 118.
'Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Thurman, (Civ.
App. Tex.) 176 S. W. 762, 763 (1915). New York & New Haven R.
Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 169, 179 (1858).
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by paying a reasonable amount, equivalent to the benefit actually
received, for services and expenses rendered.9
Denial of liability on the part of the corporation might be
assumed to be the limit to which the courts have gone in discouraging the promoter; yet a number of courts have declared
that it is more reasonable to hold that any services performed
by the promoter who thereafter became a director are gratuitous.' 0 This could be taken as actual encouragement to the
new corporation to refuse compensation to the person primarily
responsible for its creation; at any rate it is unreasonable to
expect anyone under such decisions to do any promoting. 1 '
It is well to keep in mind the difficulties which the majority
of courts cannot overcome when one considers the minority
cases; for in them it can be seen that in the courts' attempt to

provide reasonable compensation for the promoter it ignored the
hurdle entirely by finding an implied contract to pay for the
benefits received and for services performed with the expectation
of being paid therefore. 12 The minority view is well expressed
in the Kentucky case of the Farmers Bank (of Vine Grove) v.
Smith which says:
"A corporation is, by an implied contract, liable for such or any
services rendered for the use of the corporation as are necessary to
its formation. . . It seems to us that any other rule would render
it difficult to organize any corporation, however necessary. No person would render the services or pay another to do so, however essential it be to organization if there was no obligation to pay by the
corporation after it is brought into existence. 113
'Machen, Modern Law of Corporations (1908) sec. 338.
"'New York & New Haven R. Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 169
(1858); Rockford R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328, 16 Am. Rep.
587 (1872).
' "It is clear that no business man will undertake the risks
incident to organization and early financial sponsorship of an industrial enterprise without at least a promise of a liberal return in case
of the successful outcome of the venture. To deny this by law is to
force the business man to adopt secret methods of securing profits
which because they are circuitous and indirect are far more socially
harmful than the open acknowledgment by law that the promoter is
entitled to pay for his services." Dewing, Op. Cit. Supra note 3, at
262, footnote J.
'Perry v. Little Rock, etc., Ry. Co. 37 Ark. 164, 172 (1881);
Grand River Bridge Co. v. Rollins, 13 Col. 4, 21 Pac. 897 (1889);
Farmers Bank of Vine Grove v. Smith, 105 Ky. 816, 49 S. W. 810
(1899); Low v. Railroad V., 45 N. H. 370, 377 (1864); Grier v. Hazard
& Co., 13 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1891); Bell's Gap R. R. v. Christy, 19 Pa.
St. 54, 21 Am. Rep. 39 (1889); Wilson v. Mears, 105 Wash. 296, 177
Pac. 815 (1919).
'Farmers Bank of Vine Grove v. Smith, 105 Ky. 816, 819, 820, 49
S.W. 810 (1899).
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Although there is no so-called minority English rule which
could be cited in support of the above view, there is an unexplained inconsistency in decisions of both the British and
American Courts in regard to the reasonable amount of compensation for pre-incorporation services and expenses which the
promoter is allowed, in the form of a recoupment, when he has
14
been sued by the corporation for the return of "secret profits.' '
The courts are silent as to the grounds on which the promoter
is permitted to retain this back door compensation. Such silence
might well be taken as apparent encouragement to the wily
promoter to attempt to make large "secret profits" on the
assumption that if he is eventually made to return them he will
at least get a reasonable compensation for his services and
expenses in the form of a recoupment, which is more than the
honest straightforward promoter could expect.
Between the majority and minority views there are a considerable number of courts that seek to avoid the harsh effects
of the technicalities of the hurdle, yet cannot shut their eyes
entirely to the legal principles which prevent them from agreeing with the minority view. They seek, therefore, to find
various distinctions whereby they can allow a recovery in quasicontract or by estoppel, where the corporation has accepted the
benefits. In none of these cases, however, do the courts allow
the promoter acting alone to recover for his services, but insist
on finding an implied contract between the promoter or corporators and a stranger, 15 and in order to bind the corporation the
pre-incorporation services must have been found necessary and
reasonable; the contract must have been made in the name of
the company with the understanding that it was for the benefit
of the future corporation and that the parties looked to it alone
for pay.16
"Mason
v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030; 1037 (1909);
Hayward v. Leason, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N. E. 656, 662 (1900); Lydney,
etc. v. Bird, 33 Ch. D. 85, 96 (1886); Emma Silver Mining Co. v.
Grant, 11 Ch. D. 918, 941 (1879); Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. D. 371,
400 (1877).
'See Clarke v. 0. & S. W. R. R., 5 Nebr. 314, 323 (1877).
Fletcher, Private Corporations, (rev. ed. 1931) 705 and 733.
" Moore & H. Hardware Co. v. Towers Hardware Co., 87 Ala.
206, 6 So. 41, 43 (1888); United German Silver Co. v. Bronson, 92
Conn.266, 102 Atl. 647 (1917); Mt. Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts, (Ind.)
151 N. E. 7 (1926); Morgan v. Bon Bon Co., 222 N. Y. 22, 118 N. E.

205, 206 (1917); Davis v. Valley Electric Light Co., 61 N. Y. Supp. 580

(1899); Bell's Gap R. R. v. Christy, 19 Pa. St. 54, 21 Am. Rep. 39
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The principal distinction made by the courts has arisen
where the company acquired property by reason of the promoter's pre-incorporation contract with the stranger and by
having accepted the benefits of the contract the corporation was
thereafter held to be estopped from denying liability. 17 The
grounds for recovery here might, however, be considerably
complicated where labor was done on the the property which
was thereafter acquired by the corporation, for if the labor were
already performed and the company then took the property it
would have no choice but to take the labor also. However, this
difficulty apparently has not worried the courts very much.' 8
In a Kentucky case where the subscribers to stock in the future
corporation contracted for improvements on the land, all of
which were intended thereafter to be taken over by the corporation, the company was in fact held liable for the amount of a
mechanic's lien or for the pre-incorporation services of a
stranger which it could refuse only by failing to take the land
upon which the assets of the corporation were based. 19 However, in an Indiana case the court says that the corporation is
not bound by the contract indebtedness because "the lien is
not the creature of the contract, but of the law. It is the law
20
and not the contract which gives the lien."
(1889); Perry v. Little Rock, etc., Ry. Co., 37 Ark. 164, 191 (1881):
"It should appear that the view of the future organization was mutual
between the contracting parties, and that the labor, material, etc.,
were furnished at the time, on behalf of the future company, with the
view, authorized by the assurances of the projectors, that the com-

pany, when chartered would assume the debt, as created in its behalf.

In such case only would the acceptances of the benefits of the contract amount to a ratification, and implied promise at law. .
Fletcher, Private Corporations, (rev. ed. 1931) p. 702.
7
Streator Independent Tel. Co. v. Continental Constr. Co., 217
Ill. 577, 75 N. E. 546 (1905); Deentile Co. v. W. E. Dunn Mfg. Co.,
229 Ky. 569, 17 S.W. (2d) 715 (1929); Maryland Apartment House
Co. v. Glenn, 108 Md. 377, 70 Atl. 216 (1908); Grape Sugar & Vinegar Co. v. Small, 40 Md. 395 (1877); Paxton Cattle Co. v. First,
etc., Bank, 21 Nebr. 621, 33 N. W. 271 (1887); Davis v. Valley Electric
Light Co., 61 N. Y. Supp. 580 (1899); Schreyer v. Turner Flouring
Mills Co., 29 Ore. 1, 43 Pac. 719 (1896).
'"Grand
River Bridge Co. v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 4, 21 Pac. 897
(1889); Chicago Building & Mfg. Co. v. Talbotton Creamery Co., 106
Ga. 84, 31 S. E. 809 (1898); Koeppler v. Redfield Creamery Co., 12
S. E.483, 81 N. W. 907 (1900).
"'Waddy Blue Grass Creamery Co. v. Davis-Rankin Co., 103
Ky. 579, 45 S.W. 895 (1898).
1 Davis-Rankin Co. v. Vice et al., 43 N. E.889 (Ind.1896).
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The basis upon which the courts find a further distinction
on which to allow a recovery, is not as firm as that where the
corporation could accept or reject property received under
contract with strangers, for in the following cases it is difficult
21
to see how the corporation could object to the benefits received.
For instance, in the Kentucky case of Morton v. Hamilton
College22 , the plaintiff advanced money to the promoters with
the agreement and understanding that it was to be repaid to
him by the corporation when it was brought to life. The court
says in this case that the corporation will be estopped from
denying that the promoters had power to bind it when the very
payment of the money gave the corporation life. In an Ohio
case also we find the court saying "that where promoters of a
corporation go forward in good faith and contract debts which
are necessary to the creation and advancement of the corporation, and the corporation afterwards avails itself of the benefits
of those acts, the corporation is liable, and upon the plainest
principles of justice and right it should be held." 23 It is
contended herein that the latter court is quite right that the
corporation should be liable upon the principles of justice and
right, but it is impossible to see the liability in terms of contract
or agency.
Another reason for distinction even weaker than the preceding one has been found in the proposition that where a
majority of the subscribers or promoters contract for services,
the corporation when formed will be liable therefor.2 4 Why a
number of agents without a principal is better than one is not
explained; and even if the corporation existed, what, it is asked,
would be the result if a majority of the stockholders contracted
in the name of the corporation ? The answer is obvious, for it
is a well established principle that stockholders per se are not
the corporation which can only contract through its officers or
agents.
Chicago Building & Mfg. Co. v. Talbotton Creamery Co., 106
Ga. 84, 31 S. E. 809 (1898); Maryland Apartment House Co. v.
Glenn, 40 Md. 395 (1877).
=Morton v. Hamilton College, 18 Ky. L. R. 765, 38 S. W. 1 (1896).
City Building Assn. v. Zahner, 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1068 (1891).
' Morton v. Hamilton College, 18 Ky. L. R. 765, 38 S. W. 1
(1896); Clarke v. 0. & S. W. R. R., 5 Nebr. 314 (1877); Low v. Railroad, 45 N. H. 370 (1864); Merchants Nat'l. Bk. of Carlisle v. Eckels,
191 Pa. 372, 43 Atl. 245 (1899); Bell's Gap R. R. v. Christy, 19 Pa. St.
54, 21 Am. Rep. 39 (1889).

NoTEs
The final distinction attempted by some courts, if in truth
it can be called a distinction at all, is one found in the fact that
the one performing the pre-incorporation services is an attorney.
The courts have permitted attorneys to be compensated for
such services and expenses in a number of cases. 25 All the
objections that the majority view both in the United States and
England found to making the corporation liable for the
promoter's services and expenses can be equally well found in
regard to the attorney. Perhaps, however, the court feels a
closer kinship to the attorney than to the promoter; at any rate
it describes his relation to the corporation in City Building Assn.
v. Zahner26 as being that "of 'accoucher' to this infant corporation. When it becomes able to stand and act for itself it availed
itself of his labor."
One of the reasons for defining the promoter in detail in
the beginning was to point out that he served a real economic
purpose and that he was therefore entitled to a reasonable
compensation; but it can be seen that with the exception of the
minority opinion and the cases of recoupment in an action for
the return of "secret profits" the promoter sole has found it
next to impossible to collect for his services, in bringing the
corporation into the world, if it should prove recalcitrant.
On the other hand the courts have apparently gone to extreme
lengths in attempting to compensate the stranger with whom
the promoter or corporator has found it necessary to deal in
creating the corporation and has done so on an obviously
unsubstantial basis. It is submitted that there is a real
discrimination in favor of the stranger at the expense of the
promoter, whom the courts categorically hold to be in a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation even prior to its creation, when
they hold that the stranger may deal at arm's length with the
corporation through a pre-incorporation contract with the
promoter.
'Freeman Improvement Co. v. Osborne, 14 Colo. App. 488, 60
Pac. 30 (1900); McColleg v. Blue Ribbon Gum Co., 173 Ill. App. 66
(1912); Taussig v. St. Louis & R. R. Co., 166 Mo. 28, 65 S. W. 969

(1901); City Building Assn. v. Zahner, 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1068

(1891); Merchants Nat'l. Bank of Carlisle v. Eckels, 191 Pa. 372, 43
Atl. 245 (1899).
='6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1068 (1891).
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The promoter is therefore in a dilemma. He may be in a
position by his efforts to increase substantially the wealth of
society yet hesitate because of the problematical quality of his
compensation. Particularly would this be true where, as in
most cases, the bankers take over control. It is, therefore,
suggested as a way out of the dilemma that, before any
promotional expenses are incurred or services performed, and
before the banker has been approached at all, the project
created and as it exists in the mind of the promoter be incorporated into what might be called a promoter's corporation. This
corporation would contain all the elements and features of the
final project or corporation towards which the promoter is
directing all his energies. Its articles of incorporation would
contain everything that the promoter is able to foresee as being
necessary to the corporation in its final state except its final
capitalization. If, however, there were features that needed
revising and enlarging this could be done at a future date by
simply amending the articles of incorporation of what at the
beginning was called the promoter's corporation so that finally
this preliminary corporation would grow to its full statute.
When such a procedure is followed, it is then possible for the
promoter to contract with the corporation for his compensation
and the corporation will thereafter be estopped from denying
that it was a corporation at the time of the Contract and will be
held liable. 27 To incorporate in this manner it is, however,
necessary to have a statute similar to that of Kentucky 28 which
gives the corporation an inchoate or formative existence pending completion of organization allowing it during this period a
limited corporate power to contract for reasonable and necessary promotional services as was done in the Kentucky case of
Chieppo v. Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 Atl. 940 (1914); Grand
River Bridge Co. v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 4, 21 Pac. 897 (1889); Standard
Drilling Co. v. Slate et al., 205 Ky. 714, 266 S. W. 377 (1924); Grape

Sugar & Vinegar Mfg. Co. v. Small 40 Md. 395 (1877); Paxton Cattle
Co. v. First, etc., Bank, 21 Nebr. 621, 33 N. W. 271 (1887); Low v.
Railroad Co., 45 N. H. 370 (1864); Bergen v. Porpoise Fishing Co.,
41 N. J. Eq. 238, 3 Atl. 404 (1886); Harrison v. Vt. Manganese Co.,
1 Misc. 402, 20 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1892); Bell's Gap R. R. v. Christy,
19 Pa. St. 54, 21 Am. Rep. 39 (1899).
'Kentucky

Statutes (Carroll's 1936 ed.) Sec. 541, "Until the

directors are elected the signers of the articles of incorporation shall
have the direction of the affairs of the organization of the corporation,

and may take such steps as are proper to obtain the necessary subscriptions to stock and to perfect the organization of the corporation."
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Standard Drilling Co. v. State.29 The possible joker in this
particular Kentucky statute is a provision in see. 4225 which
levies a stiff organization tax on the basis of the capital stock to
be issued, and as stated in the articles of incorporation. This
tax is payable at the moment of incorporation and might make
the cost too great if the final amount of stock contemplated were
stated in the articles of incorporation of the promoter's corporation. But as a practical matter at this stage of the promotion
and under the plan suggested here it will usually be impossible
to determine what capitalization will be necessary in the future,
because this preliminary corporation should be merely the first
step in promotion after the project has been conceived in the
mind of the promoter. Therefore, in these articles of incorporation the capitalization should be stated at a purely nominal
amount, thus avoiding the burden of the organization tax.
Then, when the promoter has performed his function as previously described, even to getting subscriptions for the necessary amount of stock which by that time would have been
ascertained, the original articles of incorporation would merely
be amended to show the real or final capitalization of the
completed project or corporation. In other words the provroter's corporationz at that time would agree to enlarge itself to
its full stature and pay all the necessary expenses of such
growth including the organization tax on the increased
capitalization.
To complete the picture, the statute providing for a
corporation's formative existence should be enlarged so as to
make it liable for reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in
drawing up and filing its preliminary articles of incorporation.
This slight change in the Kentucky statute would not affect
what has been suggested and can already be done under it at
present in regard to the formation of an inchoate preliminary
corporation, here called the promoter's corporation.
By the above procedure it is possible for the corporation
to bear the expenses necessary in creating itself which is only
just and equitable. The promoter would get his just dues and
the hurdle by which the majority of the courts have been
balked would be obviated.
0 Standard Drilling Co. v. State et al., 205 Ky. 714, 266 S. W.
377 (1924).

